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Abstract
Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability
of changing decisions by altering the cast ‘yes’ or ‘no’ votes. Recently
this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention,
just as ‘yes’ or ‘no’ votes can change decisions.
This theory is often applied to weighted voting situations, where
voters can cast multiple votes. Measuring the power of a party in a
national assembly seems to fit this model, but in fact its power com-
prises of votes of individual representatives each having a single vote.
These representatives may vote yes or no, or may abstain, but in some
cases they are not even there to vote. We look at absentees not due to
a conscious decision, but due to illness, for instance. Formally voters
will be absent, say, ill, with a certain probability and only present
otherwise. As in general not all voters will be present, a thin majority
may quickly melt away making a coalition that is winning in theory
a losing one in practice. A simple model allows us to differentiate
between winning and more winning and losing and less losing coali-
tions reflected by a voting game that is not any more simple. We use
data from Scotland, Hungary and a number of other countries both
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to illustrate the relation of theoretical and effective power and show
our results working in the practice.
Keywords and phrases: a priori voting power; power index;
being absent from voting; minority; Shapley-Shubik index; Shapley
value.
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1 Introduction
When we think of voting, we think ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes and a simple counting
of the ‘yes’ votes determines the outcome. In practice veto rights or weighted
voting add some complexity; the UN Security Council or the EU Council of
Ministers are well-known examples. The classical theories of power indices
(Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Banzhaf, 1965) describe precisely these situations
and provide formulas to calculate how much a particular voter can influence
the decisions. These theories assume that voters face a binary choice, while
there is also a third option: not voting, and this option has lead to many
important decisions in the past (Lindner, 2008).
Ternary voting games (Felsenthal and Machover, 1997; Braham and Stef-
fen, 2002; Freixas and Zwicker, 2003), allowing for abstention are richer, but
still fail to capture the entire problem. In the records of the Hungarian Na-
tional Assembly a voting partitions members of the parliament into typically
five sets: The groups voting ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are clear. Those voting ‘abstain’
exercise the third option perhaps not realising that their vote is practically
the same as a ‘no’ (it could also be a ‘yes’ in other situations). Then there is
another, slightly stronger version of abstention (from the point of our model
these are equivalent): being there but not selecting either of the previous
options. Finally there are the voters who are not even there. No-show can
be strategic (Coˆrte-Real and Peraira, 2004; Laruelle and Valenciano, 2011),
but here we focus on the non-strategic aspect: It is not that the members of
parliament (MPs) do not want to vote, but they cannot — due to illness or
previous engagement (MPs have many).
Since (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) adopted the Shapley value to measure
a priori voting power, we use simple games to model voting situations. In
these games a coalition is either winning and has a payoff of 1, or losing
getting 0.
For instance, in the weighted voting situation with a quota of 51 and 3
voters having voting weights 48, 26, 26 any pair has the majority and is a
winning coalition, while singletons cannot make decisions alone and hence
have a 0 payoff. Due to its symmetry , the power indices derived from the
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induced simple game will be symmetric, too suggesting that the three players
have equal power. This contradicts both one’s intuition and the empirical
evidence, which shows that larger players tend to have larger influence irre-
spective of their possible symmetry in the voting game.
In most voting situations weights arise naturally, corresponding to the
number of seats a voting block can secure in a legislative body. Such examples
include national parliaments, local governments, or the European Parliament.
We take the first as our motivating example, our voters are parties, and the
actual votes are cast by MPs. Unlike in genuine weighted voting, here the
party leaders can speak for their parties, but then MPs decide whether or not
to vote and whether they want to vote along party lines. Rebel voting can
further enrich the model, it is a natural extension that we do not elaborate
here.
We focus on situations where some MPs refuse or are unable to vote with
a certain probability. In our model the weights are random variables, and so
is the outcome of a voting situation. We call these games generalised voting
games, and consider the Shapley-Shubik index as a tool for measuring the
power in these situations. In order to give a solid background for the use
of the Shapley-Shubik index we show that Young’s (1985) axiomatisation of
the Shapley value work on the class of generalised voting games.
While the model is formally presented later, the consequences for our
simple examples are immediately clear. The coalition of the smaller parties
is very insecure, it loses its majority if only a few voters are absent, while a
coalition including the large parties has a wide majority, where a few votes
do not matter. The coalitional membership of this large player is valued
more leading to a higher power.
The paper is then organized as follows. We introduce the usual notation
and standard terminology in Section 2. In the third section we discuss the
problem of abstention and introduce our model, the concept of generalised
voting games. We devote Section 4 to the axiomatisation of the Shapley
value for generalised voting games. Then we take a look at absent voters in
practice in the US Senate, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly of
Hungary and a few other legislative bodies. We close with a short summary.
2 Power indices
First we introduce the usual terminology and notation. Let N = {1, . . . , n}
be the set of the players. v : 2N → R is a transferable utility (TU) cooperative
game (henceforth game) with player set N , where v(∅) = 0. For any player
i and any coalition S: v′i(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S), that is v′i(S) is player
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i’s marginal contribution to coalition S in game v. Let v′i be for player i’s
marginal contribution function in game v. Player i is a null-player in game
v if v′i = 0. We write that i ∼v j, player i is equivalent with player j in game
v, if for any coalition S such that i, j /∈ S: v′i(S) = v′j(S). Finally, |A| is for
the cardinality of set A.
A voting situation or voting game is a pair (N,W), where the players are
the voters and W denotes the set of winning coalitions. We consider simple
voting games where
1. ∅ /∈ W and N ∈ W ,
2. if C ⊆ D and C ∈ W , then D ∈ W ,
3. if S ∈ W and T ∈ W , then S ∩ T 6= ∅.
Condition 3 requires the game to be proper, that is, a motion and its
opposite cannot be approved simultaneously.
Let Γ¯N denote the set of proper simple voting games over the player set
N .
We can also write a simple voting game in the form of a transferable utility
game v, where v(S) = 1 if S ∈ W and 0 otherwise. The term ”simple” comes
from having coalitions with payoffs 0 or 1 only.
Weighted voting games are simple voting games where the importance
of each player is expressed by a weight and a coalition is winning if the to-
tal weight of its members exceeds the quota characteristic of the game. A
weighted voting game can be expressed by an n+1 tuple (q, w) = (q, w1, . . . , wn)
consisting of the quota to pass a resolution and a vector w of voting weights.
Let wS =
∑
i∈S wi and let ΓˆN denote the set of weighted voting games with
player set N . Weighted voting games with q > wN/2 are proper simple
voting games. While there are infinitely many weighted voting games, since
there are only a finite number of simple voting games, many of these are
equivalent.
We study the players’ ability to change decisions. If, by joining a losing
coalition, a player can turn it winning, we call the player swing. Voting power
then refers to this ability to change decisions.
Given a game v of Γ¯N , an a priori measure of voting power or power
measure κ : Γ¯N → RN+ assigns to each player i a non-negative real number
κi(v), its power in game v; if for any game v of Γ¯N :
∑
i∈N
κi(v) = 1, then it is
also a power index.
In the following we explain some of the well-known indices. The Shapley-
Shubik index φ (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) applies the Shapley value (Shap-
ley, 1953) to simple games: Voters arrive in a random order; if and when a
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coalition turns winning the full credit is given to the last arriving, the pivotal
player. A player’s power is given as the proportion of orderings where it
is pivotal, formally for any simple voting game v player i’s Shapley-Shubik
index in game v is as follows
φi(v) =
∑
S3i,S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
(v(S)− v(S \ {i})) ,
where s = |S|.
The Banzhaf measure ψ (Penrose, 1946; Banzhaf, 1965) is the vector of
probabilities that a party is critical for a coalition, that is, the probabilities
that it can turn winning coalitions into losing ones. Formally, for any simple
voting game v player i’s Banzhaf-measure in game v is as follows
ψi(v) =
ηi(W)
2n−1
,
where ηi(W) is the number of coalitions in W in which i is critical. When
normalized to 1, we get the Banzhaf index β (Coleman, 1971). Formally, for
any simple voting game v player i’s Banzhaf index in game v is as follows
βi(v) =
ηi(W)∑
j∈N
ηj(W) .
3 The men who weren’t even there
The mainstream voting power literature takes it for granted that if a player
has the right to vote, he or she will use this right and express a clear opinion.
Indeed, the general approach is to model voting situations by voting games.
This model has been enriched by models with abstention (Braham and Stef-
fen, 2002; Machover and Felsenthal, 1997; Lindner, 2008): Machover and
Felsenthal (1997) consider voters facing a ternary decision: vote ‘yes’, ‘no’ or
‘abstain’ and the choice is completely symmetric with respect to these op-
tions, thus abstention is one of the voting alternatives. In practice abstention
is often regarded as a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ vote, depending on circumstances. The
abstention of some of the voters usually reduces the chances of the passing
of a motion, but there are examples of the other kind too, the most striking
being probably the USSR’s boycott of the UN Security Council that has led
to sending UN forces to Korea, a motion the Soviet Union strongly opposed
and would have been able to veto. Braham and Steffen (2002) argue that
abstention is a totally different action and voters first decide whether they
want to form an opinion on the issue and if the answer is yes, then they vote.
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While abstention may have the same effect as before, here voters do not care
about the consequences. Both models, however, assume that voters abstain
strategically.
Suppose not all voters are present, and their absence is not a strategic
decision, but it is unplanned. One might say that if voting is important
other engagements could be postponed and thus being absent is essentially
the same as abstaining. In some legislative bodies, however, majority is
relative to those present, and hence abstention corresponds to a ‘no’ vote,
while not voting is the true abstention. In voting statistics, however, MPs are
usually listed in 4 categories: those in favour, those against, those abstaining
and those present, but not voting, not to mention those who weren’t even
there. Here we focus on this latter group and for simplicity ignore abstention,
both genuine and strategic.
3.1 Model
We study the power of voting blocks, such as parties in a legislation while
allowing individual members to be absent from voting. In the following we
formalise the model. Consider a weighted voting game (q, w1, w2, . . . , wn) or
briefly (q, w), where q is the quota, and wi is the weight of player i (the num-
ber of MPs of party i). At a particular vote some are sick (or busy elsewhere)
and only w′ = (w′1, w
′
2, . . . , w
′
n) are present, where w
′ ≤ w. The rules of the
legislation determine a possibly different quota q′ for these reduced number
MPs, leading to the weighted voting game (q′, w′) that can then be solved
using the standard theories applicable to weighted voting games. However,
it also can happen that too many MPs are absent, therefore the given legis-
lation is not able to pass any proposal. This situation cannot be modelled by
a weighted voting game, because the grand coalition is not a winning coali-
tion. However, this situation can be described by the 0 game, where every
coalition has 0 value.
Going a step beyond the usual approaches we assign probabilities p(q, w)
to each of the games (q, w), where the parties have respectively w1, . . . , wn
voters present and q is the quota. Generally speaking, we consider the case,
where the numbers w of MPs that are present and the quota q are random
variables with the joint probability distribution p(q, w). Every outcome of
(q, w) determines a simple game (more precisely a weighted voting game or
the 0 game), and the generalised voting game v˜ is the weighted sum of the
considered simple games with weights of p(q, w).
Note that not all simple voting games can be generated by weighted
voting games (Taylor and Zwicker, 1992; Elkind, Goldberg, Goldberg, and
Wooldridge, 2008).
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Definition 1. The generalised voting game v˜ is defined as follows
v˜ =
∑
v∈ΓˆN∪{0}
v pˆ(v) ,
where pˆ is an arbitrary probability distribution on the set ΓˆN∪{0}. Moreover,
let Γ˜N denote the class of generalised voting games with player set N .
Notice that every weighted voting game is a generalised voting game, and
0 is also a generalised voting game.
Next we give two examples for illustration.
Example 1. Assume that in a legislation the parties have w1, . . . , wn MPs,
the quota q is independent of the number of MPs present, and the MPs are
present with same probability p and independently of one another. Then the
probability that w′ ∈ RN , w′ ≤ w MPs are present is
p(w′) =
n∏
i=1
(
wi
w′i
)
pw
′
i(1− p)wi−w′i , (3.1)
Since the quota q does not change, for any coalition S
v˜(S) =
wS∑
i=q
(
wS
i
)
pi(1− p)wS−i ,
where wS =
∑
i∈S
wi.
The Hungarian National Assembly of 2006 had six parties and 386 rep-
resentatives. The game of simple, absolute majority1 can be written as
(q, w) = (194; 190, 141, 23, 20, 11, 1). Let the probability of missing a ses-
sion be 1 − p = 0.1. We look at three coalitions: w{1} = 190, w{1,3} = 213
and w{1,2} = 331. The latter two are winning coalitions, but v˜({1}) = 0,
v˜({1, 3}) = 0.35, and v˜({1, 2}) = 1.
Example 2. Now consider relative majority. To remain winning coalition
S must outnumber the complementary coalition N \ S or generally: it must
have a share ρ = q
wN
of the total. Suppose that S has i, the complementary
coalition j members present. Then S is winning, if i ≥ ρ(i + j), that is, if
j ≤ 1−ρ
ρ
i. In fact j ≤
⌊
1−ρ
ρ
i
⌋
, where b·c denotes the integer part. The value
of coalition S is calculated as
1Voting by absolute majority is rare in Hungary, but is the common voting method in,
for instance, Luxembourg.
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v˜(S) =
wS∑
i=1
b 1−ρρ ic∑
j=0
(
wS
i
)
pi(1− p)wS−i
(
wN − wS
j
)
pj(1− p)wN−wS−j
=
wS∑
i=1
b 1−ρρ ic∑
j=0
(
wS
i
)(
wN − wS
j
)
pi+j(1− p)wN−(i+j) .
(3.2)
We continue the example of the Hungarian National Assembly. While
in the previous example all zero coalition in the ordinary weighted voting
game remained zero coalition in the generalised voting game, with relative
majority there are zero coalitions whose values become positive. Such is the
case for v˜({1}) = 0.16 (in an ordinary weighted game it is v({1}) = 0).
In the following we drop the tilde, v can mean a voting game or a gener-
alised voting game – this will lead to no confusion.
4 The Shapley-Shubik index
The generalised voting games are not necessarily simple games, the values of
coalitions can be strictly between 0 and 1, so the usual power indices cannot
be applied. We can, however return to TU games and use values to determine
the power distribution. Instead of the Shapley-Shubik index, we can use the
Shapley value, or instead of the Banzhaf index (or measure) we can use the
Banzhaf value, but to stress the parallel features with simple voting games
we keep on using the term power index for values.
There are many values for TU games and the choice is not easy. Which
value should one use? We can answer this question by characterising the
values by elementary axioms, reasonable properties, and examining which
values meet the given axioms. We conclude that the Shapley-Shubik index
(Shapley value) is the only solution concept which meets the recommended
properties.
Therefore, in this section we characterise the Shapley value on the class of
generalised voting games. We show that the Shapley value is the only solution
on the class of generalised voting games which meets three axioms: Efficiency,
Symmetry and Marginality. Put it differently, we show that (Young, 1985)’s
axiomatisations of the Shapley value works on the class of generalised voting
games.
Note that an axiomatisation for a class of TU games does not imply a
similar axiomatisation on super- or subclasses of TU games. The fact that
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Young (1985)’s axiomatisation works on the class of monotone TU games
concludes nothing about the validity on the class of generalised voting games,
a subset of the class of monotone games. Moreover, even if Young (1985)’s
axiomatisation works on the class of weighted voting games and the class of
weighted voting games is a subset of the class of generalised voting games,
these still do not imply anything for Young (1985)’s axiomatisation on the
class of generalised voting games.
We stress that we do not only show that Young (1985)’s axiomatisation
works in this case, but we apply, with certain modifications, the concept of
his proof as well. Therefore, although there are some alternative proofs for
Young (1985)’s axiomatisation (Moulin, 1988; Pinte´r, 2011), ours is based on
the original one.
For any quota q the weighted voting game v is a monotone simple game.
For the games v, w ∈ ΓˆN let v ∨ w = max{v, w}. Notice that if i ∼v j and
i ∼w j, then i ∼v∨w j.
Furthermore, for any simple voting game v letMv ⊆ 2N be the set of the
minimal winning coalitions of a game v. Then
v =
∨
T∈Mv
uT ,
where uT is the unanimity game on coalition T . Later, we also need the
following result.
Lemma 2. For any simple voting game v and T ∗ ∈Mv let
w =
∨
T∈Wv\{T ∗}
uT .
Then for any i /∈ T ∗: w′i = v′i.
Proof. Let S be an arbitrary coalition. Two cases can happen: (1) T ∗ * S.
Since i /∈ T ∗ uT ∗(S) = uT ∗(S ∪ {i}) = 0, therefore v(S) = w(S) ∨ uT ∗(S) =
w(S) and v(S ∪ {i}) = w(S ∪ {i}) ∨ uT ∗(S ∪ {i}) = w(S ∪ {i}). Put it
differently, v′i(S) = w
′
i(S).
(2) T ∗ ⊆ S. Then v(S∪{i}) = v(S) = 1, i.e v′i(S) = 0. Indirectly assume
that w(S∪{i})−w(S) > 0. Then w(S∪{i}) = 1 and w(S) = 0, that is S∪{i}
is a minimal winning coalition in game w. Since Ww = Wv \ {T ∗} it means
that S∪{i} is a minimal winning coalition in game v, which contradicts that
T ∗ is a minimal winning coalition in game v.
Furthermore, let 1vT = 1 if T is a winning coalition in simple voting game
v and 1vT = 0 otherwise. Then
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v =
∨
T⊆N
1vTuT . (4.1)
In the following we introduce the three axioms which we use in our char-
acterisation result.
Definition 3 (Axioms). The solution κ : Γ˜N → RN satisfies
• Efficiency, if for all v˜ ∈ Γ˜N : v˜(N) =
n∑
i=1
κi(v˜),
• Symmetry, if for all v˜ ∈ Γ˜N and for all i, j ∈ N such that i ∼v˜ j:
κi(v˜) = κj(v˜),
• Marginality, if for all v˜, w˜ ∈ Γ˜N , for all i ∈ N such that v˜′i = w˜′i:
κi(v˜) = κi(w˜).
The axiom of Efficiency goes back to Shapley (1953). Efficiency is a very
natural axiom for a solution on the class of voting games or of weighted
voting games. It says that the whole power of the given legislation must be
distributed among the parties. Since the generalised voting games are natural
generalisations of weighted voting games, it is very reasonable to assume this
axiom for this class of games either.
Symmetry applies only to equivalent players and is, therefore, weaker
than Anonymity (Shapley, 1953). This axiom expresses that if two parties
(players) are equivalent from the viewpoint of a voting situation, then their
values must be equal, that is, no discrimination is permitted. As Anonymity,
Symmetry is also a plausible axiom.
The Marginality axiom is due to Young (1985). Although he formally
introduced a stronger axiom, Strong Monotonicity using inequalities, at the
end of his paper he mentioned that inequalities can be replaced by equal-
ities in the results he provides. He does not give a name for this weaker
axiom; Marginality is our term. This axiom states that if in two voting situ-
ations a given party (player) performs with the same success, then it must be
evaluated in the two situations identically. This axiom expresses that only
the performance of the party matters, no other factors are to be taken into
account.
Remark 4. It is important to note that since the Shapley value (Shapley-
Shubik index) is (completely) determined by the marginal contributions, it
is true that for any game v and w, and for any player i: if v′i = w
′
i and
κi(w) = φi(w), then the Marginality axiom implies that κi(v) = φi(v).
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In the following proposition, without proof, we present a well known
result.
Proposition 5. The Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley solution) meets the ax-
ioms Efficiency, Symmetry and Marginality.
The following lemma is about a key observation. It states that the prop-
erty that every weighted voting game is the maximum of unanimity games
on winning coalitions in the given simple voted game, see Equation (4.1), is
practically true for generalised voting games as well.
Lemma 6. For any generalised voting game v˜
v˜ =
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
∨
T⊆N
pv˜(w)1
w
TuT =
∨
T⊆N
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
TuT . (4.2)
Proof. Let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary coalition. Then
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
∨
T⊆N
pv˜(w)1
w
TuT (S) =
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w) max
T⊆N
{1wTuT (S)}
=
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
SuS(S) ,
that is, this is the probability that coalition S is a winning coalition. Fur-
thermore,
∨
T⊆N
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
TuT (S) = max
T⊆N
 ∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
TuT (S)

=
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
SuS(S) ,
that is, this is again the probability that coalition S is a winning coalition.
Notice that
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
TuT is a generalised voting game for any coali-
tion T .
Next we consider Young (1985)’s axiomatisation of the Shapley value.
The following theorem is our axiomatisation result.
Theorem 7. On the class Γ˜N solution κ satisfies Efficiency, Symmetry and
Marginality if and only if κ = φ, that is κi is the Shapley-Shubik index for
any generalised voting game and for any player i.
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The proof of Theorem 7 – a non-trivial modification of Young (1985)’s
proof to our setting – is relegated to Appendix A.
Summing up the above discussion, by assuming that an ideal power in-
dex must meet the axioms Efficiency, Symmetry and Marginality we get
the Shapley-Shubik index, therefore in the following we consider only the
Shapley-Shubik index.
Unfortunately alternative axiomatisations of the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953; Chun, 1991; van den Brink, 2001) could not be translated into our
setting. Shapley (1953) uses Additivity as an axiom: Even though we can
modify this axiom by replacing + by operator ∨, it is very difficult to give
any reasonable interpretation to this axiom in our generalised voting game
setting. In Chun (1991)’s and van den Brink (2001)’s characterisations, the
Shapley-Shubik index (the Shapley value) does not even satisfy the similarly
modified axioms. Therefore, in these cases, the reasonable and interpretable
modifications of the original axioms do not go with the Shapley-Shubik index
(the Shapley value), hence we do not consider these axiomatisations either.
5 Absenteeism in practice
In this section we discuss several examples from various democracies to in-
vestigate how missing representatives can influence the distribution of power.
While voting statistics should be of general interest, it proved to be rather
difficult to obtain such data. In special cases these data are meaningless:
the House of Commons of the United Kingdom uses a very ancient voting
method, where the quorum refers to the number of votes cast rather than
the voters present and the possibility that an MP votes on both sides cannot
be excluded.
The data we did manage to obtain show a great variance in the attitude
to absent representatives.
5.1 US Senate
Our first example is the US Senate. According to the voting statistics for
111th Congress (Senate Legislative Information System, 2009, 2010) there
have been a total of 696 votes and a total of 2197 instances of not voting.
Therefore on average 3% of the Senators have not voted. In addition senators
“present, giving live pair” are recorded separately: when a senator is unable
to attend a critical vote, a senator with the opposite voting intention does
not vote. This way an illness or a commitment of higher importance does not
upset the majority decision of the Senate. While in about 1% of the decisions
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the winning (relative) majority fails to have absolute majority, these figures
suggest that opportunism plays little role in the legislation of the Senate.
5.2 Scottish Parliament
The Scottish Parliament does not have the full legislative power of a national
parliament, but the agenda of the of the Scottish National Party that ob-
tained majority in May 2011 contains issues as ambitious as independence so
the stakes are equally high. According to our data (Scottish Parlament Infor-
mations Centre, 2010) on average 8.2% of the MSP’s have not been present
at the 698 votes during the period May 2007 – May 2010.
Party Seats SS-index (%) GSS-index (%)
Scottish National Party 69 100 99.834
Scottish Labour Party 37 0 0.035
Scottish Conservative Party 15 0 0.035
Scottish Liberal Democrats 5 0 0.035
Scottish Green Party 2 0 0.034
independent 1 0 0.026
Total 129 100 100.000
Table 1: Power distribution in the Scottish Parliament in 2011
In Table 1 we present the power distributions given by the Shapley-Shubik
index and the generalised Shapley-Shubik index using the current distribution
of the seats assuming that the absence rate has not altered with the elections.
It is clear that the Scottish National Party holds the majority of seats, and
despite the fact that the majority extends to several seats, the SNS will only
be decisive in 99.83% of cases.
5.3 France and Italy
France has a presidential system with a bicameral parliament. We focus on
the National Assembly, the lower house of the Parliament. It consists of 577
members each elected in single member constituencies in a two-round ballot.
Such a system tends to give a wide majority for the ruling parties.
The statistics of the 13th Legislation (2009-2010) of the Assemble´e Na-
tionale (Assemble´e Nationale, 2010, p. 61) reveal that on the average vote
16.3% of the representatives have been absent! This would leave much room
for the opposition to obstruct the lawmaking had the prime minister not
had a safe majority in the past years. Of course the safe majority may also
explain the high rate of absence.
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While this exists in France, too, Italian laws blocked by the opposition
are not uncommon, although we found that these are not so much due to
absent, but rebel MPs. Such a rebel MP votes against the party position and
thereby does not only decrease the size of its own party, but increases the
size of the opposition. The inclusion of rebel MPs is a very natural extension
of our model.
5.4 Finland, Australia
Finland provides an interesting example of a minority government, a minority
by only 2 seats. Since the parliament is not large, the minority can easily
become a majority. Ignoring political realities we simply take the number of
seats obtained in the April 2011 elections, assume that the government acts
as a single party and assume that p = 0.9. We find (Table 2 that with absent
MPs, the power of the minority government increases significantly.
Party Seats SS-index (%) GSS-index (%)
Government 99 60 73.26
Social Democratic Party 42 10 6.76
True Finns 39 10 6.76
Left Alliance 14 10 6.76
Christian Democrats 6 10 6.46
Total 200 100 100,00
Table 2: Power distribution in the Finnish Parliament, 2011 with minority
government.
The House of Representatives of Australia consists of 150 representatives
elected in single member constituencies by the so-called preferential system.
Such a system is very sensitive to voter preferences, which usually guar-
antees a strong majority for one of the (two) major parties. In the 2010
elections, however, none of the large parties obtained majority and currently
the country is lead by a minority Labour government. While four of the 6
crossbenchers have given confidence and supply to provide nominal majority,
with full support from these representatives a similar rate of absence as in
other countries the government would have only 77.7% of power.
5.5 The National Assembly of Hungary
Finally we discuss the case of Hungary in some length as, with thin majorities
and a higher rate of abstention she illustrates several of the interesting cases
rather well.
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Party Seats SS-index (%) GSS-index (%)
Labor, Green, 3 independents 76 100 77,7
Coalition 72 0 14,3
National Party WA 1 0 4,0
independent 1 0 4,0
Total 150 100 100,0
Table 3: Power distribution in the Australian House of Representatives, 2010
with four crossbenchers supporting the minority Labor government.
The Hungarian National Assembly has 386 seats with MPs elected in a
very complex system with both single member constituencies, some compen-
sation for the losing votes but also party-lists with proportional representa-
tion are used to fill the places.
Of the 4104 ballots in 2009 the highest number of votes cast was only 382
and on average a mere 353 MPs were present and voting. This means that
only p = 91.55% of the MPs are normally present. We use this value in our
calculations.
Government: Single-party Coalitional
Seats SS GSS SS GSS
Hungarian Socialist Party 209 100 88,4 100 100
Alliance of Free Democrats 70 0 2,3
Hungarian Democratic Forum 38 0 2,3 0 0
Independent Smallholders’ Party 26 0 2,3 0 0
Christian Democratic People’s Party 22 0 2,3 0 0
Federation of Young Democrats 20 0 2,3 0 0
Total 385 100 100,0 100 100
Table 4: Hungarian National Assembly in 1994: Thin majority requires coali-
tional government. (Power indices in percents.)
Our first example is the composition of the parliament after the 1994 elec-
tions, when the Socialists obtained 54.3% of the seats. Table 4 shows that
despite having an absolute majority, the Hungarian Socialist Party would
alone have only about 88.4% of power due to absent members, so they formed
a coalitional government with the Alliance of Free Democrats, the only party
that did not refuse to cooperate with the former Communists. The resulting
majority with 279 seats was not only sufficient to be absence-proof for sim-
ple majority, but also for constitutional changes. Interestingly Mr Orba´n’s
current cabinet (Table 5) has a similar ability having 99.45% of power for
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laws that require qualified majority, falling short of the Horn-cabinet of 1994
that left only about 10−15 to the opposition.
Government: Single-party Coalitional
Seats SS GSS SS GSS
Federation of Young Democrats 227 75,0 74,941 100 99,451
Christian Democratic Pple’s Party 36 8,3 8,274
Hungarian Socialist Party 59 8,3 8,367 0 0,159
Movement for a Better Hungary 47 8,3 8,367 0 0,159
Politics Can Be Different 16 0,0 0,034 0 0,159
independent 1 0,0 0,017 0 0,073
Total 386 99,99 100,000 100 100,000
Table 5: Power distribution for double-majority laws in the HNA, 2010.
Seats SS GSS
Hungarian Socialist Party 190 83,3 70,72
Alliance of Free Democrats 18 3,3 6,22
Federation of Young Democrats 141 3,3 6,22
Christian Democratic People’s Party 22 3,3 6,22
Hungarian Democratic Forum 9 3,3 5,99
independent 6 3,3 4,64
Total 386 100,0 100,0
Table 6: Power distribution in the HNA in 2009.
Finally, in last year of the 2006-2010 legislature the Socialist formed a
cabinet with minority support. Table 6 shows that while under the standard
theories any party would be sufficient for the HSP to obtain majority, with
absent MPs the majority is more difficult to obtain.
6 Discussion
Ours is not the first paper to study voting power in an assembly, in fact
a long series of papers used national or regional parliaments as examples.
Rusinowska (2002); van Deemen and Rusinowska (2003); Rusinowska and
van Deemen (2005) respectively study paradoxes of voting power in Polish,
Dutch and German politics; Lane and Mæland (1995) analyze voting power in
Scandinavian countries. Bilbao, Jime´nez, and Lo´pez (1998); Alonso-Meijide,
Carreras, and Fiestras-Janeiro (2005) use the Spanish and Catalan parlia-
ments as illustration for games on convex geometries and to voting power
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with a coalition structure. These approaches, however treat parties as unan-
imously voting blocks, that is, as a single voters with weights corresponding
to the number of representatives. Our approach is, to our best knowledge,
original.
Most of the aforementioned papers calculate voting power under the as-
sumption that the parties act independently. While Lane and Mæland (1995)
find ample evidence of surviving minority governments, outside the Nordic
countries a typical government is formed by a majority coalition of some of
the parties. These parties vote unanimously in support of the government
and thus act as a single party with the majority of the seats. Calculat-
ing power indices with the coalition taken into account is not very exciting:
the majority takes all all the power. This paints a rather grim picture of
(most) parliamentary democracies where majority coalitions act as dictators
between elections.
A The proof of Theorem 7
In order to apply the concept of Young (1985)’s proof we need the following
result:
Lemma 8. Let v be an arbitrary weighted voting game, and player i be such
that there exists T ∗ ∈ Wv such that i /∈ T ∗. Then player i is either a null-
player or there exists a weighted voting game w such that T ∗ /∈ Ww ⊆ Wv
and w′i = v
′
i.
Proof. Let v = (q,N1, . . . , Nn) be a weighted voting game, T
∗ be a minimal
winning coalition in game v and player i be such that i /∈ T ∗.
Two cases can occur: (1) player i is not in any minimal winning coalition
in game v. Then player i is a null-player, hence v′i = 0 = 0
′
i.
(2) Player i is a member of a minimal winning coalition in game v. Let
k =
∑
i∈T ∗
Ni, that is k is the number of votes coalition T
∗ has. Let e = k−q+1
(notice that k ≥ q), moreover, let q′ = q + e, N ′i = Ni + e and for all
j ∈ N \ {i}: let N ′j = Nj. Every minimal winning coalition in game v which
player i is a member of, is a minimal winning coalition in the voting situation
(q′, N ′1, . . . , N
′
n), so w = (q
′, N ′1, . . . , N
′
n) is a weighted voting game such that
T ∗ is not a winning coalition and Ww ⊆ Wv. Furthermore, it is easy to see
that for all T ∈ Wv \ Ww: i is a null-player in game uT , therefore Lemma 2
implies that w′i = v
′
i.
The proof of Theorem 7.
17
If : Proposition 5 states that the Shapley-Shubik index satisfies the ax-
ioms Efficiency, Symmetry and Marginality.
Only if : The proof goes by induction on the number of minimal winning
coalitions.
Notice that 0 is a generalised voting game. Furthermore, axioms Effi-
ciency and Symmetry imply that κ(0) = 0 = φ(0).
Let v˜ be an arbitrary generalised voting game. From Lemma 6
v˜ =
∨
T⊆N
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
TuT .
For any T ⊆ N let uv˜T =
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
TuT . Then for all i, j ∈ N such that
i, j ∈ T or i, j /∈ T : i ∼uv˜T j, and if i /∈ T then i is a null-player.
LetWv˜ =
{
T ⊆ N : ∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pv˜(w)1
w
T > 0
}
, that is the minimal winning
coalitions in v˜ are the coalitions which are minimal winning coalitions with
positive probability.
Let n be an arbitrary natural number, and assume that for all generalised
voting games v˜ such that |Wv˜| ≤ n it is true that κ(v) = φ(v). Moreover, let
w˜ be a generalised voting game such that |Ww˜| = n+ 1.
Divide the player set N into two subsets N1 and N2. Let N1 contain the
players which are not member in all minimal winning coalitions in game w˜,
that is N1 = {i ∈ N : ∃T ∗ ∈ Ww˜, i /∈ T ∗}. Let N2 = N \N1.
Let i∗ ∈ N1 be an arbitrary player and T ∗ ∈ Ww˜ be such that i∗ /∈ T ∗.
We know that
w˜ =
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
∨
T⊆N
pw˜(w)1
w
TuT .
Then for any w ∈ ΓˆN ∪ {0} two cases can happen: (1) pw˜(w)1wT ∗ = 0, in
this case let z(w) = w, (2) pw˜(w)1
w
T ∗ > 0. In the latter case, from Lemma
8 either there exists a weighted voting game z(w) such that T ∗ /∈ Wz(w)
and v′i∗ = z(v)
′
i∗ , or i
∗ is a null-player in game w. In the letter case (i is a
null-player in w) let z(w) = 0. Then from Lemma 6
z˜ =
∨
T⊆N
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
pw˜(w)1
z(w)
T uT =
∑
w∈ΓˆN∪{0}
∨
T⊆N
pw˜(w)1
z(w)
T uT
is a generalised voting game and w′i∗ = z
′
i∗ .
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For any w ∈ ΓˆN ∪ {0} such that pw˜(w) > 0, T ∗ /∈ Wz(w), hence |Wz˜| ≤ n.
Then from the induction hypothesis: κ(z˜) = φ(z˜). Therefore, the Marginality
axiom implies that κi∗(w˜) = φi∗(z˜).
For any i, j ∈ N such that i, j ∈ T : i ∼uw˜T j, and any i, j ∈ N2 are such
that i, j ∈ T for all T ∈ Ww˜, hence the Symmetry axiom implies that for
any i, j ∈ N2 κi(w˜) = κj(w˜).
Summing up the above discussion and applying the Efficiency axiom, we
get that κ(w˜) is well defined (it is uniquely defined). Therefore, Proposition
5 implies that κ(w˜) = φ(w˜).
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